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Notes
Unfolding Discovery Issues That Plague
Sexual Harassment Suits
KATIE M. PATTON*

INTRODUCTION

There is no question that a sexual harassment victim endures pain,
humiliation, and suffering as a result of the harassment itself.
Unfortunately, the pain and humiliation do not end with the harassment
if the victim chooses to bring a lawsuit against her harasser. As early as
the discovery stage of the litigation, a victim can suffer from further pain
and humiliation if her harasser chooses to subject her to an intrusive
discovery process whereby her past sexual activity and conduct is looked
at with a fine-tooth comb-a process that can sometimes imply that she
invited the harassment through her own promiscuity. However, the
shortfalls of this intrusive, humiliating discovery process were eventually
recognized, as seen by changes in the federal court system and an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence
412 (Rule 412) is commonly known as the "rape shield rule." Originally,
Rule 412 was used in criminal proceedings and was designed to keep out
intimate details of a victim's prior sexual history in a criminal rape or
sexual abuse case. In 1994, Congress amended Rule 412 to extend the
"shield" to victims involved in civil sexual abuse and harassment cases.
The pivotal consequence of amending Rule 412 to apply to civil cases is
that it created a "presumption against admissibility at trial of a plaintiff's
sexual history with any person besides the defendant."2 However, even
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006. I am grateful to
Audrey Jing whose editorial contributions to this Note have been tremendously helpful. I would also
like to thank Professor Angela Riley for being a wonderful role model and a great mentor.
Additionally, I thank my family and friends for their overwhelming support the past three years.
I.Pub. L. No. 103-322, lo8 Stat. 1919 (1994) (codified as FED. R. EVID.412 (I994)).
2. Ethan A. Heinz, Note, The Conflicting Mandates of FRE 412 and FRCP 26: Should Courts
Allow Discovery of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs Sexual History?, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 520
(999).
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eleven years after Congress amended Rule 412, judges and practitioners
alike are still grappling with the many discovery questions that arise in a
sexual harassment suit.
The presumption in Rule 412 is that a sexual harassment victim's
sexual history and propensities are inadmissible. As it pertains to civil
cases, Rule 412 states, "evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially
outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to
any party."3 It is important to keep in mind that Rule 412 is to be read as
an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, which allows evidence of
an alleged victim's character to be admissible if the probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the potential harm from its introduction In
essence, for a sexual harassment defendant to use evidence of the
victim's past sexual behavior or predisposition, the defendant must
overcome the Rule 412 presumption by showing that the evidence's
probative value substantially outweighs any danger that would be
inflicted on the plaintiff as a result of its admission at trial
However, because Rule 412 is an evidentiary rule, it is ill-equipped
to handle the many questions that arise in the discovery stage, well
before the Rule 412 presumption is applied. Some discovery concerns
include: whether the plaintiff should be compelled to submit to a mental
examination per the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 (Rule 35); what
scope of discovery is available to the defendant under Rule 26; whether
the plaintiff should be granted a protective order per Rule 26(c) to
protect his or her privacy interest; and most recently, what scope of
electronic discovery should be available.
An important policy consideration behind Congress' decision to
amend Rule 412 and extend the presumed "shield" protection to civil
cases was to make sexual harassment victims feel more comfortable in
bringing forth a meritorious claim.5 Fearing credibility attacks in the
courtroom, sexual harassment victims are sometimes loathe to bring their
claims. Further, some suggest that the "attack the victim" strategy that
endures in the courtroom is just as distressful as the harassment that has
already occurred.' The extension of Rule 412 to civil cases is meant to
3. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2).
4. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 404.
5. See Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,51 (D.D.C. 1997) ("The logic behind the
note is self-evident: one of the purposes of Fed. R. Evid. 412 was to reduce the inhibition women felt
about pressing complaints concerning sex harassment because of the shame and embarrassment of
opening the door to an inquiry into the victim's sexual history."); see also FED. R. EVID.412 advisory
committee's note.
6. Richard C. Bell, Note, Shielding Parties to Title
VII Actions for Sexual Harassment From the
Discovery of Their Sexual History-ShouldRule 412 of the FederalRules of Evidence Be Applicable to
Discovery?, 12 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y 285, 294 (1998).
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protect sexual harassment victims; however much of the intimidation that
occurs in a sexual harassment suit occurs during the discovery process
where Rule 412 proves useless against abusive, probing discovery
techniques.
Although, as a rule of evidence, Rule 412 does not dictate the
appropriate scope of discovery in sexual harassment cases, courts will
sometimes use Rule 412 as a guiding post to create the line between
permissible and impermissible discovery in these suits. However, sexual
harassment victims would undoubtedly be better protected from
discovery abuses if there was a bright-line discovery rule in place that
furthered Rule 412's goal of encouraging victims to bring forward
meritorious sexual harassment claims.
This Note surveys some of the more common discovery issues that
plague sexual harassment suits. Part I provides a brief overview of a
sexual harassment claim and the specific elements needed for this cause
of action. Part II will examine the struggle between the policies
underlying Rule 26 (generally allowing parties to engage in a broad
scope of discovery) with the Rule 412 presumption aiming to protect a
sexual harassment plaintiff's right to privacy. Part III examines
compelled mental examinations and their underlying worth in
determining the scope and amount of distress the victim suffered as
quantified in damages the plaintiff should receive. Part IV will focus on
the relatively new issues that arise with electronic discovery and
specifically how that will come to impact a plaintiff's ability to bring forth
a sexual harassment suit. In conclusion, I will discuss briefly how Rule
412 plays a reactive, rather than proactive role in the discovery process,
and the impact of that role on a sexual harassment plaintiff during the
discovery process.
I. OVERVIEW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
This Note will focus solely on federal cases and will examine Title
VII sexual harassment claims. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 states it is
"an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin... ." Meritor Savings Bank v.
"

Vinson, the leading United States Supreme Court case, sets out the
standard for a sexual harassment claim: "The gravamen of any sexual8
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'
As to proving "welcomeness," the Meritor Court commented: "[I]t does
not follow that a complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is
7.

42 U.S.C. 2oooe-2(a)(I) (2000).
8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57,68 (1986).
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irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found
particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is
obviously relevant."9
As a result, the notion of "welcomeness" has become central to
those defending against sexual harassment claims'" both for quid pro quo
harassment and hostile work environment harassment suits. "Quid pro
quo harassment occurs when 'submission to or rejection of [unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature] by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual .... Hostile environment
harassment occurs when conduct "'has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment ....
Eight years after Meritor was decided, Congress amended Rule 412 to
allow the "rape shield" rule to apply to civil cases-namely sexual
harassment suits. However, because Rule 412 had no bearing on the
scope of allowable discovery, Congressional intent to protect privacy
invasions regarding sexual history and propensities was simply not being
met by the expansion of Rule 412."
II.

THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF DISCOVERY IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT

CASES: THE POLICY STRUGGLE BETWEEN RULE 412 AND RULE 26

Evidentiary rules such as Rule 412 generally do not dictate the
procedure parties must follow during the discovery stage of litigation.
Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to provide for
a broad scope of discovery to allow parties the opportunity to investigate
14
all information that is relevant to any claim or defense being pressed.
As such, Rule 412 is silent on the scope of discovery. However, the
Advisory Committee notes to Rule 412 provide courts with some
direction on limiting the scope of discovery so as not to contravene the
policy behind extending Rule 412 to civil cases. The Advisory Committee
suggests courts balance evidence under Rule 412 standards 5 prior to
allowing discovery to take place. This balance, in effect, requires the

9. Id. at 69.
io. Jane H. Aiken, Protecting Plaintiffs' Sexual Pasts: Coping with Preconceptions Through
Discretion,51 EMORY L.J. 559, 572 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § I6O4.1 I(a)(3) (EEOC Guidelines)).
xi. Lisa Dowlen Linton, Comment, Past Sexual Conduct in Sexual Harassment Cases, 75 Cm.KENT L. REv. 179,80 0i999).
12.

Id.

13. See generally FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
I r See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
15. See Heinz, supra note 2, at 520 (Rule 412 only allows evidence of a sexual harassment

plaintiff's prior sexual history and disposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger
of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party, with the presumption strongly weighted
against admissibility of this kind of evidence.).
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party seeking discovery to show the evidence sought to be admitted
as
6
relevant, thereby overcoming the presumption of inadmissibility.'
Defendants in sexual harassment suits undoubtedly can argue that
evidence of a plaintiff's prior sexual history is relevant. However, with
the admission of information regarding the victim's past sexual history
comes the potential misuse of that information by the jury." Presumably,
the jury can become tainted after hearing about a sexual harassment
victim's past sexual experience, and based on that information, assume
that the victim somehow "asked for" or "welcomed" the harasser's
advances.'" Like a rape victim, a sexual harassment victim should not
have her reputation attacked in the courtroom, and consequently have to
risk losing credibility with regards to her harassment claim merely
because she has a sexual history. For purposes of the sexual harassment
suit, the victim's past sexual history, with anyone other than the
defendant, should be irrelevant. 9
One objective behind amending Rule 412 was to protect against
cultural stereotypes and sexual myths."0 However, because Rule 412
requires the judge to subjectively balance the probative value of the
evidence against the danger of harm to any victim and unfair prejudice to
any party, the judge's assessment inevitably includes his value judgments
along with any stereotypes he or she might hold about the given
situation.' In order for Rule 412 to work, "judges must be willing and
able to stand back from their own beliefs to determine if they are
engaging in these stereotypical ideas in assigning the evidence probative
16. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note states: "Courts should presumptively issue
protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery... show[s] that the evidence
sought to be discovered would be relevant under the facts and theories of the particular case, and
cannot be obtained except through discovery."
17. Jacqueline H. Sloan, Comment, Extending Rape Shield Protection to Sexual Harassment
Actions: New Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Undermines Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 25 Sw. U. L.
REv. 363, 369-70 (1996). Based on their own moral beliefs, jurors can potentially make judgments of a
plaintiff based on the admissibility of information concerning her or his sexual history or
predispositions. "There is a danger that jurors will base their decisions on their own general
stereotypes of women rather than on the proper issue: the guilt or innocence of the particular
defendant." Id.
18. Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 16o (2d Cir. 2000) ("Whether a sexual advance was welcome,
or whether an alleged victim in fact perceived an environment to be sexually offensive, does not turn
on the private sexual behavior of the alleged victim, because a woman's expectations about her work
environment cannot be said to change depending upon her sexual sophistication."); accord SocksBrunot v. Hirschvogel Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, I 17 (S.D. Ohio 1999) ("The fact that an employee entered
into a consensual relationship with one co-worker or supervisor does not mean that he or she has
invited quid pro quo demands from a supervisor."); Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48,
52 (D.D.C. I997).
19. Mitchell v. Hutchings, 1i6 F.R.D. 481, 485 (D. Utah 1987) ("Past sexual conduct does not
callous one to subsequent, unwelcomed sexual advancements.").
20. Aiken, supra note iO,at 570.
Sloan, supra note 17, at 395 ("[B]ecause... Rule 412 is a balancing test, the outcome ... will

21.

depend to a large extent on the beliefs of the judge hearing the arguments.").
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value and in assessing prejudice and harm."22 This "stand-back"
approach judges must undertake when analyzing Rule 412 admissibility
should also be done when setting the scope of discovery under Rule 26.
The policy behind Rule 26 is to allow parties to engage in a broad
scope of discovery in order to accumulate evidence in support or defense
of their cases.23 The advisory note to Rule 412 is meant to temper Rule
26's broad discovery range by instructing judges to limit the scope of
discovery on a plaintiff's sexual history. 4 The Advisory Committee
suggests judges even go one step further by presumptively granting
protective orders to plaintiffs who seek them in order to protect them
from the defense delving into their sexual histories. 5 Although Rule
412's advisory note is meant to guide discovery rulings, it is ultimately
not binding and the final determination is left to the judge's discretion.
Some sexual harassment plaintiffs have successfully urged courts to
bar discovery on their sexual histories. These plaintiffs have argued that
because the sexual history evidence the defendant is seeking would be
inadmissible under Rule 412, regardless of the broad discovery permitted
by Rule 26, the discovery should not take place at all. This approach not
only protects the victim's privacy but also further prevents the plaintiff
from suffering additional undue distress and potential intimidation."
The court in Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory considered the issue of how much discovery on a
sexual harassment plaintiff's past sexual activity was appropriate."
Herchenroedernoted that when determining what scope of discovery is
appropriate in sexual harassment cases, the court should look to both
Rule 26 to determine the proposed discovery's relevance and to Rule 412
before sexual history discovery would be permitted. 8
When determining the scope of discovery in sexual harassment suits,
the court engages in a very precarious balance in order to ensure justice
and fairness to all parties in the litigation. Although the plaintiff's privacy
should be protected both during the trial and in the discovery process,
there is an obvious need that the defense be allowed ample discovery to
fully defend the charges alleged against him. 9

Aiken, supra note to, at 570-71.
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(i) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party." (emphasis added)).
24. FED. R. EviD. 412 advisory committee's note
22.

25. Id.

26. Barta v. Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 134-35 (D. Haw. 1996).
27. Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 79, 18o-8i (D. Md.
1997).

28. Id. at 182.

29. Heinz, supra note 2, at 529 (The "purpose of discovery is to promote justice by facilitating the
truth-seeking process.").
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However, in addition to the balancing problem courts must grapple
with, there is also the potential for discovery abuse. Discovery can be
used to gain a tactical advantage by increasing the other side's litigation
expenses so high as to force either settlement or dismissal.3" In sexual
harassment suits, discovery abuse not only involves an "increasing the
cost" strategy, but additionally can lead to the plaintiff enduring a
heightened invasion of privacy in order to see his or her suit through to
fruition.3 When considering the scope of discovery, judges should keep
in mind this potential of abuse and how it will affect the plaintiff's
bringing forth the sexual harassment claim.
Prior to the amendment of Rule 412, a defense practitioner's journal
encouraged counsel to bring up a plaintiff's sexual history in the
deposition.3" The journal noted, "One way to illicit (sic) possible
assertions (of chastity, in order to be able to introduce impeaching sexual
history evidence) by plaintiff is to accuse her in the deposition of prior
'questionable' or 'loose' sexual conduct."" The journal added that an
attorney cannot bring this accusation up "with no basis, but it is fair game
to bring up workplace rumors, particularly if the alleged harasser was
aware of them ....Plaintiffs sometimes react to such questions before
their counsel realizes that even
simple denials of certain conduct may
' '34
permit broader examination.
The discovery process for any litigant can be an arduous experience.
But when discovery is not limited in scope by the presiding judge, the
process can be particularly unpleasant for sexual harassment victims. As
Judge Posner aptly stated, "being deposed is scarcely less unpleasant
than being cross-examined-indeed, often it is more unpleasant, because
the examining lawyer is not inhibited by the presence of a judge or jury
who might resent hectoring tactics."3 As Posner notes, discovery takes
place in the absence of a judge. With no referee to call the shots, one can
only surmise the intrusive abuses and invasions of privacy that occur
during discovery. 6 Thus, the presiding judge must be mindful that the
underlying purpose behind Rule 412's "shield" of protection37 is to
30. Id. at 530.
31. Id. ("[A] sexual harassment suit
...typically involves hostile, aggressive behavior and sharp

questioning of the victim.... [Mlany defense attorneys are willing to use the discovery phase of a trial
to pressure the complainant." (footnote omitted)).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Richard G. Moon & Julie Boesky, Discovery Problems and Solutions in Sex
HarassmentCases, 463 PLI/Lit 63, 73 (1993)).
34. Id. at531.
35. Id. (quoting DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920,923 (7th Cir. 1988)).
36. Aiken, supra note io, at 566.
37. Howard v. Historic Tours of Am., 177 F.R.D. 48, 51 (D.D.C. 1997) ("[Olne of the purposes of
Fed. R. Evid 412 was to reduce the inhibition women felt about pressing complaints concerning sex
harassment because of the shame and embarrassment of opening the door to an inquiry into the
victim's sexual history.").
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encourage sexual harassment victims to come forward with their
meritorious claims. The judge should consider applying discovery
protections to prevent the above-mentioned types of intimidation tactics
from occurring in the first place. The mere fact that the information
uncovered in the discovery stage is never presented at trial does not
make up for the fact that the victim had to endure invasive, intrusive and
intimidating discovery tactics in order to get to the trial stage. 8
Although it is the judge's role to provide discovery protections,
plaintiffs' counsel should be mindful that "the procedural safeguards
provided by Rule 412 do not automatically apply in the discovery phase
of the lawsuit. Accordingly, defense counsel is free to inquire in
depositions and interrogatories about the sexual background and sexual
predisposition of a plaintiff without concern about maintaining the
confidentiality of the relationship."39 Also important is for plaintiffs'
counsel to remember that "defendants are borrowing a page from the
book of criminal defense attorneys and aggressively using the sexual
behavior and attitude of plaintiffs in and out of the workplace to show
that the plaintiff welcomed the allegedly offensive conduct."4
When a judge is asked by plaintiffs' counsel to limit the scope of
discovery in sexual harassment cases, the judge must be aware of the
policy struggle between Rule 26 and Rule 412. Because there is a history
of broad discovery in the ordinary course of litigation,4 ' most defendants
in sexual harassment suits will continue to adhere to this broad discovery
unless specifically directed not to. In attempts to obtain unfettered
discovery in sexual harassment cases, a defendant will essentially
circumvent Rule 412 through invasive and intrusive document requests,
depositions and interrogatories.'
In Sanchez v. Zabihi, a district court was asked to consider an
interrogatory propounded by the defense which asked plaintiff to
provide information regarding "personal, romantic, or sexual advances"
that she had made toward other employees over the past ten years.43 The
judge found the interrogatory to be overbroad, explicitly noting "the
importance of not undermining Rule 412 in discovery and [accordingly]
placed limits on the defendant's interrogatories." '
Although the plaintiff can enable certain discovery protections
38. Aiken, supra note so, at 56o-6I ("As is clear.... civil defendants use the threat of such
discovery to intimidate plaintiffs into dropping their cases.").
39. Julie A. Springer et al., Survey of Selected Evidentiary Issues in Employment Law Litigation,
50 BAYLOR L. REV. 415, 431 (1998).
40. Id. at 416.
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).

See Linton, supra note iI,at i9o.
43. Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166 F.R.D. 500, 501 (D.N.M. 1996).
44. Linton, supra note ii,at i9o.
42.
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under the combined use of Rule 26 and Rule 412, it is not as though
sexual harassment defendants are at a complete loss to engage in the
necessary discovery to defend themselves from the charges. Defendants
have the great weight of Meritor behind them. The Supreme Court's
analysis in Meritor provides sexual harassment defendants with a wide
array of evidentiary tools, holding that to prove that the plaintiff's
workplace conduct was in fact welcoming,45 "evidence of sexual behavior
'' 6
and attitudes in the workplace [therefore must be] ... admissible.
Additionally, defendants can attack the veracity of a plaintiff's claim in
order to "weed out false and exaggerated claims."47 Further, under
Meritor, defendants will always be able to demonstrate the plaintiff's
conduct was "welcom[ing]" by introducing evidence such as "sexually
provocative speech or dress [or] the giving of an expensive gift. 8
In the interest of justice, judges must be mindful both of Rule 26 and
Rule 412. Defendants have an obvious need to engage in all relevant
discovery to defend themselves from the allegations. Plaintiffs have an
obvious need to protect their privacy about nonrelevant sexual history
and propensities. Courts, in setting the scope of discovery in a sexual
harassment suit, must consider the needs of both the plaintiff and the
defendant and ultimately keep in mind the policy underlying Rule 412.
III.

COMPELLED MENTAL EXAMINATIONS: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN

35 AND RULE 412.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35, when the mental
condition of a party "is in controversy," a court can order the party to
submit to a mental examination after a showing of good cause has been
made by the party requesting the examination.49 Mental examinations,
like other methods of discovery, have the potential to be abused by
sexual harassment defendants. These compelled mental examinations
can ultimately be used to intimidate a sexual harassment victim from
either bringing a meritorious claim forward, or if a claim has been
brought, from forging ahead with the lawsuit." Without the court
stepping in to provide protections, there is potential for sexual
harassment plaintiffs to endure an unfettered psychological and sexual
history inquiry that would otherwise be barred by the underlying policy
RULE

45. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("[Tlhe gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."').
46. Springer, supra note 39, at 431.
47. Allan H. Weitzman, Employer Defenses to Sexual Harassment Claims, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 27,30 (1999).
48. Id. at 34.
49. FED R. Civ. P. 35(a).
5o . Kent D. Stressman, Note, Headshrinkers, Manmunchers, Moneygrubbers, Nuts & Sluts:
Reexamining Compelled Mental Examinations in Sexual Harassment Actions Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 8o CORNELL L. REV. 1268, 1272 (1995).
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of Rule 412." Additionally, because the majority of sexual harassment
plaintiffs undergo a compelled mental examination alone-without the
presence of their attorney, a third party, or even a recording devicethese examinations often go unchecked and can be much more invasive
than would otherwise be permitted pursuant to the policy underlying
Rule 412.2
There is little consensus among courts as to when a sexual
harassment plaintiff should be compelled to submit to a Rule 35 mental
examination.53 However, this is not to suggest that compelled Rule 35
mental examinations occur as a matter of right. In order for a party to
obtain a compelled mental examination of another litigant, it must first
demonstrate to the presiding judge that the condition it wishes to
examine is in fact "in controversy" per Rule 35's requirements and
additionally must show "good cause" for compelling the mental
examination. Once a defendant has made a showing of "in controversy"
and "good cause," presumably a plaintiff will assert that the mental
examination is invasive, intrusive on his or her privacy rights and
unnecessary; the decision is left to the judge's discretion whether or not
to compel the mental examination.
There is a growing concern that allowing Rule 35's compelled
mental examinations to proceed undermines the policy considerations
behind Rule 412. Rule 412 seeks to protect sexual harassment plaintiffs
by limiting evidence about their sexual history and propensities. This
protection was offered to sexual harassment plaintiffs to encourage them
to bring meritorious claims forward. However, allowing defendants to
circumvent the Rule 412 shield by allowing the mental examination to
move forward without any limits or protections runs afoul of the rule's
very purpose. 6 When a judge considers a motion to compel examination,
the judge should determine what value the examination results will add
to a factfinder's decisionmaking. 7 Additionally, the judge should
consider protecting the plaintiff's privacy against what value the
defendant claims the examination will yieldi5 Finally, the judge should
consider the scope of the proposed examination. 9
What purpose should a compelled mental examination serve? One
51. See generally id.

Id. at 1320.
53. Id. at 1275.
54. FED. R. CIv. P. 35; see Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964) (stating that the party
bringing forth the motion to compel must make an "affirmative showing" that the issue is "genuinely
in controversy" and "good cause" truly exists).
52.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

FED. R. EvID. 4t2 advisory committee's note,
See generally Stressman, supra note 50.
See id. at 13o6-o9.
Id. at 1309-12.
Id. at 1309-13.
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purpose in a sexual harassment suit should be to gauge the emotional
distress the plaintiff claims. However, there are multiple purposes for
which the compelled mental examination is used, and some are not
always legitimate. Some defense attorneys use the mental examination as
an opportunity to assess the credibility of the plaintiff and of the specific
claim the plaintiff is asserting. 6° Mental examinations 6that assess the
plaintiff's credibility are "consistently denied" by courts.", '
Mental examinations might give the defendant more information
about the plaintiff's psychological
state than he otherwise would have
62
been able to access or uncover. For instance, if during the examination
the defendant uncovers information that the plaintiff has previously been
sexually abused, the defendant "may choose to use [this] discovered
information.., to undermine both the plaintiff's claims of [sexual
harassment]
discrimination.., and [plaintiff's] claims for emotional
63
damages."

The judge needs to assess the examination's purpose while also
keeping in mind that emotional distress and pain are intangible and
difficult to quantify. 6' One should question how the examination will aid
the factfinder, since assessment of a plaintiff's "amount" of emotional
damages, as diagnosed by an expert, is extremely subjective. 6' One
should further consider just how valuable this information is in the
factfinder's determination of the amount the plaintiff should receive as
compensatory damages for his or her emotional distress.6
Typically in sexual harassment suits, a judge will only grant a
compelled mental examination when the plaintiff has put his or her
emotional or mental health at issue. 6 However, there is no apparent
bright-line rule for when and under what circumstances a plaintiff has
put her mental or emotional health at issue. Research findings indicate
that it is normal for plaintiffs to be "distressed by sexual harassment, and
thus, claims of pain and suffering should not necessarily place a plaintiff's
mental health at issue."' '

Id. at 1317 (citation omitted).
6i. Id.
62. Margaret Bull Kovera & Stacie A. Cass, Compelled Mental Health Examinations, Liability
Decisions, and Damage Awards in Sexual Harassment Cases: Issues for Jury Research, 8 PsYCh. PuB.
POL. & L. 96,99 (2002).
63. Id.
64. Stressman, supra note 50, at 1313.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1315 ("[M]ental examinations of plaintiffs claiming mental anguish are unlikely to
aid the factfinder in calculating monetary damages. Emotional damages are inherently intangible.").
67. Id. at 1301-02 ("Generally, plaintiffs who seek equitable remedies under Title VII do not
place their mental condition in sufficient controversy to warrant an examination; those seeking tort
remedies generally do." (citations omitted)).
68. Kovera & Cass, supra note 62, at 97.
60.

1002
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Although there is no bright-line rule on whether compelled mental
examinations are appropriate and warranted in a given sexual
harassment discovery proceeding, it should be noted that protections and
limits can be imposed on the examination that would uphold the policy
behind Rule 412. California, for example, has procedures in place that
are designed to protect sexual harassment plaintiffs during mental
examinations. 69 California courts have given presiding judges authority to
allow a plaintiff to bring a tape recorder into the examination.' The
plaintiff's attorney can object later to the admissibility of impermissible
discovery at the trial stage, based on the recording.7' In contrast, federal
rules do not provide plaintiffs with any such protective measures during
the mental examination.7"
Another avenue to protect plaintiffs during a compelled mental
examination is to have the examination conducted by a court-appointed,
independent psychologist. If the defendant is, in fact, truly interested in
getting an accurate psychological assessment of the plaintiff's emotional
distress damages, then arguably there should be no objection to a courtappointed psychologist conducting the examination.73 By contrast, the
defendant's psychologist or psychiatrist hired to examine the plaintiff is
hardly neutral; he is a "hired gun" conducting an exam that "can often
amount to a 'de facto deposition."' 74 By appointing a neutral and
independent psychologist, the court (and plaintiff) can be assured that
the plaintiff will not be subjected to a credibility assessment via the
mental examination. This would also ensure that the jury will not be
subjected to a "battle of the experts" in assessing the amount of the
plaintiff's damages for emotional distress.
Three reasons have been asserted for denying, or at least limiting the
scope of, a compelled mental health examination in sexual harassment
suits. 75 Vinson v. Superior Court provided two reasons: i) mental

examinations, by their nature, are invasive of a person's "thoughts and
thought process"; and 2) allowing unrestricted mental examinations
potentially discourages sexual harassment victims from reporting and
pursuing meritorious claims because of the fear of further intrusion as a
result of the discovery. 6 The court in Vinson also asserted that an
unrestricted mental examination may in fact "exacerbate a plaintiff's

69. See CAL. CODE. CIV. P. § 2017(d); Stressman, supra note 50, at 1327.
70. See Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404,413 (Cal. 1987).
71. Id.
72. See Stressman, supra note 5o, at 1323.
73. Id. at 1321 (citing Jansen v. Packing Corp. of Am., 158 F.R.D. 409,411 (N.D. Ill. T994)).
74. Id. at 1324-25 (citing Jukabowski v. Lengen, 450 N.Y.2d 612, 614 (App. Div. 1982)).
75. Richard A. Bales & Priscilla Ray, M.D., The Availability of Rule 35 Mental Examinations in
Employment DiscriminationCases, 16 REv. LmG. 1, 5-7 (I997).
76. Id. at 5-6; see Vinson, 740 P.2d at 410.
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emotional distress, thereby contributing to the very problem which the
plaintiff seeks to remedy by filing a [sexual harassment] claim.""'
Accordingly, when the judge is presented with a Rule 35 motion to
compel a psychological assessment of a sexual harassment plaintiff, there
are many factors to consider in making the final determination. The
judge should again be guided by the policy considerations of protecting a
plaintiff's sexual history and propensities that underlie the amendment to
Rule 412. If the judge finds either that the plaintiff's emotional distress is
genuinely "in controversy" or that the plaintiff has put her emotional
health at issue, the judge should then consider whether the compelled
examination warrants any protections or limitations to preserve the
plaintiff's privacy interests.
IV. NEW DISCOVERY QUESTIONS POSED BY ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 34
Over the past two decades, virtually all companies have gone from
paper file cabinets to electronic file cabinets as a result of computers,
email and other electronic storage devices . As a result of this
transformation into a paperless society, there has been a shift in the way
discovery is conducted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 (Rule 34)
governs document production requests. Rule 34 has been construed
broadly enough that a "document" also includes electronic information.
Thus, parties are entitled to seek electronic discovery ("e-discovery") the
same way they would be able to request a particular document out of a
file cabinet under Rule 34 .79

E-discovery can potentially be a "gold mine or a minefield" for
sexual harassment plaintiffs."' E-discovery requests appear as if they
could be infinite, but just as with paper-based discovery, there are still
limitations on what parties can seek under Rule 34, specifically
pertaining to reasonableness, convenience and expense. However, even
with these limitations, there is still a massive amount of potential ediscovery because of the large volume of information now stored on
computers, networks, back-up systems and in emails. Requests for ediscovery can quickly become costly because of the large amount of
information stored electronically.
77. Bales & Ray, supra note 75, at 6.
78. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a) advisory committee's note.

19

79. Lisa M. Arent et al., EDiscovery: Preserving,Requesting & ProducingElectronicInformation,
& HIGH TECH, L.J. 131, 133 (2002).

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER

8o. Michael Marron, Note, Discoverability of "Deleted" E-Mail: Time for a Closer Examination,
U. L. REV. 895, 905 (20O2).

25 SEATTLE

81. Stephen D. Williger & Robin M. Wilson, Negotiating the Minefields of Electronic Discovery,
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 52, 55 (2004), availableat http://law.Richmond.edu/jolt/vloi5/article52.pdf.
82. See Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting the ediscovery request could cost nearly $25o,o00 to retrieve).
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As a result of this high production cost, some courts have devised a
cost-shifting scheme whereby the party seeking the e-discovery pays for
the production."' While the cost-shifting scheme has merit, a problem
arises where private parties (e.g., sexual harassment victims) are engaged
in litigation with large corporations, and these large corporations seek to
shift the cost of e-discovery requests to the plaintiffs. Shifting the cost of
e-discovery production could effectively prohibit plaintiffs from bringing
forward meritorious claims, simply because the plaintiffs do not have the
financial resources to engage in the necessary discovery. In effect, this
cost-shifting scheme can be used as a form of discovery abuse or as a way
to intimidate plaintiffs from either bringing their claims forward or
moving ahead with the litigation.
A leading case on e-discovery, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC,
noted that "[a]s large companies increasingly move to entirely paper-free
environments, the frequent use of cost shifting will have the effect of
crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases."" The
Zubulake decision suggests that cost shifting is only applicable to85
discovery of documents stored in "inaccessible" electronic formats.
However, the cost of restoring and searching such documents can exceed
$200,000 when the defendant is a large corporation, as in Wiginton v. CB
Richard Ellis, Inc.86 This large amount has the potential to impede a
sexual harassment plaintiff's suit from moving forward.
Attorneys can be particularly aggressive about going after ediscovery in hopes of finding a smoking gun." Because e-mails tend to be
more candid, spontaneous, and informal, there is a hope that vital
information can be found within them.88 E-mails additionally tend to hold
"valuable" evidence because: "(i) e-mail users generally produce a large
quantity of messages... ; (2) the content of e-mail messages tends to be
less formal and more likely to contain sentiments unavailable from other
sources; and (3) an e-mail is extremely difficult to permanently
destroy." ' While there is considerable potential to acquire what
83. See FED. R. CIv. P. 34 (the party providing the requested information typically pays for the

cost of production).
84. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309,317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
85. Id. at 318, 324.
86. Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 570.
87. Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation:Is
Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 4 B.C. L. REV. 327, 329 (2ooo) (After discovery of an email which referred to
terminating the plaintiff with the words, "[glet rid of that tight-assed bitch," plaintiff's sexual
harassment was settled.).
88. Carey Sirota Meyer & Kari L. Wraspir, E-Discovery: Preparing Clients for (and Protecting
Them Against) Discovery in the ElectronicInformation Age, 26 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 939, 940 (2ooo);

Marron, supra note 8o, at 9o6-08 ("[lIt is possible that e-mail users may tend to be more open in their
correspondence because they are under the mistaken impression that they can simply delete a message

that might later seem to be inappropriate or an inaccurate portrayal of their true thoughts.").
89. Marron, supranote 8o, at 9o6.
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attorneys hope will be vital information through e-discovery, they most
often get thwarted on undue burden and expense objections.'
There are three alternative approaches courts use in determining
whether the costs of an e-discovery request will be borne by the
requesting party. The first approach was laid out in McPeek v. Ashcroft
and is referred to as the "marginal utility approach."'" The marginal
utility approach dictates that the more likely it is that a search will turn
up critical information, the more fair it is that the responding party
should search at its own expense.92 The second approach, as described in
Rowe Entertainment,Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., identifies eight
factors for the court to consider in the cost-shifting analysis, one of which
incorporates the marginal utility test.93 The third approach, emphasized
in Zubulake, modifies the Rowe approach to the extent that it interprets
the Rowe test as generally favoring cost shifting, which in effect ignores
the normal presumption that the responding party should bear the costs
of production requests.'
In Wiginton, the court further modified the Zubulake approach "by
adding a factor that considers the importance of the requested discovery
in resolving the issues of the litigation."95 In Wiginton, plaintiffs filed a
class action suit against defendant, CB Richard Ellis, Inc., alleging a
"nationwide pattern and practice of sexual harassment." The Wiginton
plaintiffs sought e-discovery in the form of e-mails and information
stored on CB Richard Ellis computers nationwide. Because the cost of
complying with this discovery request was estimated to cost CB Richard
Ellis close to $250,000, the court entertained a cost-shifting analysis to
determine which party should bear the costs of the e-discovery request.'
In keeping with the three alternate approaches outlined above, the
Wiginton court ultimately looked at eight factors in determining whether
to shift the e-discovery production costs to the requesting party, the
plaintiffs. 9'
90. Meyer & Wraspir, supra note 88, at 944. Just like other discovery, electronic data is
discoverable only if "the request satisfies the requirements of Rule 26.... [Tihe information must be
relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit, not unnecessarily cumulative or duplicative; the burden
or expense must not outweigh its benefit; and it must not be subject to a claim of privilege nor
protected by the work product doctrine." Id.
91. McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2OO).
92. Id.
93. Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 2o5 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).

94. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309,320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
95. Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 572-73 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
96. Id. at 569.
97. Id. at 570.
98. Id. at 573-74.The eight factors the court considered were:
(i) the likelihood of discovering critical information; (2) the availability of such information
from other sources; (3) the amount in controversy as compared to the total cost of
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As noted by the Wiginton court, because the presumption is that the
responding party pays for the discovery requests, be it paper or
electronic information being sought, the responding party is the one who
has the burden to demonstrate that the costs should in fact be shifted to
the requesting party.' In evaluating the eight factors, the court noted
that the plaintiffs, who were former employees of CB Richard Ellis, were
clearly at a disadvantage compared to the large corporation in terms of
financial resources.' However, the Wiginton court ultimately concluded
that the plaintiffs should bear a portion of the discovery costs in restoring
the electronic storage information tapes and transferring the data on the
tapes to an electronic data viewer.'I '
Wiginton is a prime example of the problems sexual harassment
plaintiffs will likely face in the future as our society moves toward
electronic storage systems and away from tangible paper storage. While
the cost-shifting scheme has merit, particularly in cases like Wiginton
where document production costs can be upwards of $250,000, it must be
noted that this will likely have a crippling impact on sexual harassment
claims being brought forward in the first place. Additionally, the
potential for discovery abuse and intimidation increases if the defendant
threatens or pursues a cost-shifting motion for e-discovery requests.
CONCLUSION

Rule 412 is an evidentiary rule that is not designed to protect parties
from discovery abuses. Although the Advisory Committee note to Rule
412 suggests that judges should keep in mind the rule's underlying
purpose when deciding discovery limits, judges by no means are bound to
protect plaintiffs through these limitations. Further, because the scope of
discovery is quite liberal, allowing parties to obtain discovery regarding
any matter relevant to the claim or defense of any party,"2 parties are able
to engage in broad discovery which may not ultimately be admissible at
trial. In the context of a sexual harassment suit, this broad discovery may
subject the plaintiff to a grueling experience that some suggest is as
production; (4) the parties' resources as compared to the total cost of production; (5) the
relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation; (7) the importance of the requested discovery in
resolving the issues at stake in the litigation; and (8) the relative benefits to the parties of
obtaining the information.
Id.
99. Id. at 573.
too. Id. at 576; accord Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting that cost-shifting might lead to a crippling effects on plaintiffs bringing forward meritorious
claims and thus undermine "the strong public policy favoring resolving disputes on their merits"); see
also Williger & Wilson, supra note 81, at 61.
1i.
Wiginton, 229 F.R.D. at 577 (requiring plaintiffs to pay seventy-five percent of the discovery
costs and defendants to bear the remaining twenty-five percent).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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emotionally distressing as the harassment itself."°3
If, as a form of protection to sexual harassment plaintiffs, Rule 412 is
only going to come in after the invasive discovery has already occurred,
sexual harassment victims might hesitate to come forward with their
claims in the first place, thereby contravening the policy underlying Rule
412's expansion to civil suits. Rule 412 is a reactive rather than proactive
form of protection for sexual harassment plaintiffs. Thus, while the
plaintiff's privacy regarding his or her sexual history has already been
invaded during the discovery process, Rule 412 as a reaction will step in
and bar that information from being admitted at trial. Judges must be
mindful that, "[a]lthough Rule 412 is a rule controlling the admissibility
of evidence rather than its discoverability, Rule 412 must inform the
proper scope of discovery in [a] case."' 4

103. See Bell, supra note 6, at 294.
IO4. Barta v. Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996).
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